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6.1 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The main objective of this chapter is to review the fiscal and monetary 
policies of Poland for EU accession and to extract their guiding precepts. 
Only the most essential aspects of fiscal and monetary convergence are 
examined, with some attention to institutional convergence. An iri-depth 
analysis of institutional convergence falls beyond the boundaries of this 
study, as its main focus is on the systemic foundations of macroeconomic 
stabilization policies during the economic transition and in the course of 
preparations for EU accession. The chapter also examines policy options 
for the post-accession macroeconomic policy strategy which will focus on 
preparations for adopting the euro. 
This chapter underlines the importance of imposing and preserving fiscal 
discipline and political stability on the road to Poland's accession to the EU 
which took place on 1 May 2004, and to the future adoption of the euro. 
Special attention is drawn to fiscal restructuring and bringing about compliT 
ance with the European System of National Accounts. In addition, the 
implications of the expected net transfers from the EU budget are examined. 
The evolution of Poland's monetary policy, which is marked by a passage 
from a simple policy framework based on a hard peg to a modern, complex 
regime based on direct inflation targeting (DIT) is examined. With respect 
to the tasks related to monetary convergence to the euro, the main analyt-
ical hypothesis is that the current strict DIT regime is not conducive to 
adopting the euro. It needs to be more flexible, that is, to incorporate the 
objective of stabilizing the exchange rate, which, in essence, means the low-
ering of the exchange rate risk premium. However, it is advised that the 
central bank's main commitment to the low inflation target is preserved 
until the very end of the euro convergence. 
As this study focuses on the systemic foundations of macroeconomic sta-
bilization policies it does not provide a detailed account of the actual record 
of real and nominal convergence in Poland. The gradual advancement of 
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Poland's monetary policy has been so far consistent with the task of laying 
down solid foundations for a functioning market economy that, is capable of 
withstanding competition within the EU- At the final-stage of convergence 
to the euro, Poland's monetary policy needs to be focused on achieving the 
convergence benchmarks embodied in the Maastricht criteria. In general 
terms, this means embracing an appropriate policy framework and a 
sequence of policy adjustments that will be most conducive to achieving 
price stability and securing a smooth currency convergence. A proposal for 
such policy adjustments is outlined in section 6.5 on the sequencing of mon-
etary policy for euro adoption. 
The analysis begins with a brief description of the stabilization policies 
in the early 1990s which established an effective springboard for conver-
gence to the EU/EMU. Next, fiscal policy considerations are discussed, 
followed by the overview of systemic changes in Poland's monetary policy 
framework. Subsequently, alternative policy proposals for convergence 
to the euro are presented. A synthesis of the key policy prescriptions con-
cludes this chapter. 
6.2 A D V A N C I N G M A C R O E C O N O M I C POLICY: 
F R O M T R A N S I T I O N T O E U E N T R Y 
Policies for the accession of Poland to the EU constitute an extension, of sta-
bilization strategies that were e_nacted at the start of the country's swift tran-
sition from central planning to a market economy in the early 1990s. At that 
time, the initial infusion of economic stability posed a particularly serious 
challenge to the Polish economy which was plagued by a severe crisis stem-
ming directly from the pitfalls of the communist central planning. Among 
the most severe rigidities of the previous system were highly regulated prices 
set at ceilings far below market equilibrium, monopoly structures in the 
financial and industrial sectors, the execution of the central plan as the main 
business objective, non-convertible currency, and the arbitrarily-imposed 
trade ties with the former Soviet bloc (Bruno, 1992). 
In order to underpin a decisive departure from the inefficiencies of 
central planning, the now democratically elected, independent Polish 
Government instituted a radical programme of reforms in January 1990. 
The so-called Bajcerowicz Plan was aimed at dismantling the most obstruc-
tive foundations of the former command economy system (Bruno, 1992; 
Sachs, 1993). The main precepts of this radical reform programme included 
far-reaching price liberalization, full currency convertibility on current 
account, trade liberalization, fiscal consolidation and monetary policy dis-
cipline to be achieved through the hard peg of the Polish zloty to the US 
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dollar. As a consequence of massive price liberalization and the incomplete 
decomposition and privatization of state-owned monopolies, producer and 
retail prices quickly rose to market equilibrium levels, which spurred a 
short-lived corrective inflation that on the CPI-basis reached 640 per cent 
in 1989 and declined below the annual rate of 50 per cent only in 1992. 
The early 'shock therapy' programme in Poland was based on the reform-
ers' notion of 'extraordinary polities', that is, that the collapse of the old 
system created a unique window of opportunity that provided the govern-
ment with the special mandate to proclaim such reforms. Consequently, 
strong political will and commitment led to the establishment of the foun-
dations of macroeconomic stability and, later, to the pursuit of macroeco-
nomic reforms for EU accession. Polish society, having vivid memories of 
the inefficiencies and high social costs of central planning, has strongly 
endorsed the reform programme and supported the government's commit-
ment to laying down foundations for a functioning market economy capable 
of withstanding competition within the EU. However, social endorsement 
has not always been unequivocal as the transition to a deregulated and pri-
vatized economy has carried considerable welfare costs, such as the gradual 
increase in (mostly structural) unemployment that reached a monthly 
average of 19.8 per cent in the peak year of 2002. (Table 6.1) 
The early macroeconomic stabilization policies brought about consider-
able progress in economic stability in the late 1990s during the more 
advanced stage of transition and active preparations for the EU accession. 
This progress is reflected by the set of indicators presented in Table 6.1. 
The real economy and financial sector annual data show that Poland's 
monetary authorities have been able to contain inflation while avoiding 
economic recession. Yet, in the post-accession period, there is still a need 
to improve fiscal discipline and enact long-term labour market reforms to 
ease persistently high unemployment. 
As shown in Table 6.1, between 1997-2004 the CPI-based inflation fell 
from double digits to a low single digit level that in the last three reported 
years was roughly commensurate with the Maastricht price stability bench-
mark qualifying for accession to the euro.1 Yet the ambitious disinflation 
effort succeeded only by applying very high real interest rates which 
undoubtedly contributed to a significant slowdown of economic growth in 
2001-02. In that period, the inflation adjusted short-term credit refinancing 
rate was maintained at extremely high levels by the National Bank of Poland 
(NBP). This rate, which serves as the policy reference rate for NBP, reached 
its peak of 9 per cent in 2001. Having contained inflation at a sustainable 
'safe' level through such highly restrictive monetary policy, the NBP was 
able to reduce the real short-term interest rate to 2.1 per cent by 2004. Most 
importantly, high real interest rates helped establish a necessary degree of 
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Table 6.1 Selected measures of real and financial stability in Poland, 
1997-2004 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 





Real compensation per 
employee (whole economy) 
Labour productivity 
(% growth) 
Unit labour cost 
(% growth) 
Govt, budget deficit 
(% GDP) 
Govt, total debt (% GDP) 
Real short-term int. rate 
(avg. monthly) 
Bank lending (avg. m. 
growth rate) 
M3 (avg. m. growth rate) 
Current account (% GDP) 
PLN-per-EUR (ECU) 
(avg. monthly rate) 
Consumer confidence index" 


































































































































a. Ratio of optimistic to pessimistic consumers periodically compiled and reported by 
Rzeczpospolita Daily. 
b. Reported by search firms. 
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Warsaw; Eurostat; Ministry of Finance, 
Macroeconomic Survey (various issues); Rzeczpospolita (various editions). 
policy credibility that contributed to declining inflation expectations, which 
subsequently suppressed wage demands in both the public and the private 
sector, as reflected by the parallel to inflation decline in real compensation 
per employee. At the same time, a combination of large direct investments 
from domestic and foreign sources coupled with a squeeze on wage demands 
from high unemployment led to the accelerated growth of labour produc-
tivity outpacing the growth of labour compensation. As a result, unit labour 
costs that were still rising during the 1997-2001 period began to recede over 
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the following three years. Along with the monetary easing that has been 
evident over the recent two-year period, the bank lending and the M3 
money aggregate returned to higher growth rates reinvigorating investment 
and real GDP growth. As a consequence, the declining unit labour costs 
along with a brisk demand for credit and rising investment have recently 
contributed to the growth of industrial production and exports. They have 
also reduced unemployment, albeit at a very slow pace. 
As shown in Table 6.1, the macroeconomic stability conditions are 
strongly correlated with consumer confidence and job market conditions. 
High unemployment along with a wage squeeze is not conducive to raising 
consumer confidence and promoting growth in consumption. In fact, the 
recently renewed economic recovery is mainly driven by the increase in 
private investment and to some extent by sharply rising exports to the EU. 
These spending components contribute to a recognizable job creation, as 
reflected by new job offers, and to a significant improvement in the current 
account position. Nevertheless, a sustainable economic recovery is likely to 
depend on higher consumer spending, which is yet to materialize. As a 
matter of fact, it may take some time for consumer to recover from the 
recent drop in confidence about future economic conditions. One may hope 
that the stimulus of the EU accession-related income transfers along with 
the continuous commitment to a macroeconomic stability that no longer 
needs to be supported by excessively restrictive policies may ultimately 
improve this situation. 
The disciplined economic policies of the centre-right coalition govern-
ment pursued prior to 2001 did not help Poland's now-notorious political 
instability. After losing the 2001 election, the Solidarity government was 
replaced by a coalition of left-wing parties that was initially less inclined to 
maintaining fiscal discipline. However, the required commitment to a 
sound fiscal policy, which is a pillar of the post-EU accession strategy and 
its focus on convergence to the euro, forced the new socialist government 
to outline a budget-balancing strategy in its April 2004 Convergence 
Programme in a way conducive to euro convergence. Nonetheless, unpopu-
lar budget cuts cannot immediately improve the confidence of the general 
public in the economy. 
In retrospect, both the pre- and the post-EU accession strategies can be 
viewed as a logical extension of the macroeconomic policies pursued 
during the economic transition of the 1990s. The process of navigating the 
macroeconomic convergence becomes increasingly challenging in Poland 
due to unfavourable demographic dynamics and the high social costs of 
disciplined policies. 
One may further argue that in order to be successful and sustainable, 
the convergence strategy in Poland must be highly transparent. Since the 
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EU/EMU accession entails certain short-run costs, while its benefits are 
likely to materialize only in the long-run, there is a serious risk that the net 
social costs will outweigh the benefits in the near future, which may erode 
public endorsement of the convergence programme. Thus, to sustain 
social endorsement, the government must fully explain the detailed aspects 
of the convergence strategies and the expected social costs. Therefore, a 
high transparency of the convergence programme is a key prerequisite for 
its overall success. 
6.3 F I S C A L C O N V E R G E N C E 
The main aim of fiscal policy adjustments in Poland in the course of prepa-
rations for EU accession, included laying the ground for a sustainable fiscal 
discipline, developing compliance with the European System of National 
Accounts and reforming the tax system in congruence with Chapter 10 
(Taxation) of the EU acquis communautaire. Accordingly, Poland had to 
develop institutional capacity in the area of taxation and in aligning its leg-
islation with that of EU. A number of changes were made in the area of 
indirect taxation, including VAT and excise duties. In general terms, 
without resorting to the complexity of the detailed tasks, special attention 
had to be paid to the scope and definition of VAT rates, particularly the 
extensive use of zero-rating, as well as to the vast tax exemptions.2 New 
taxes were introduced with regard to direct taxation, such as a 20 per cent 
tax on interest income and a temporary 2 per cent tax on outward capital 
movements by residents only. Still, on EU entry in May 2004, Poland had 
to raise VAT and excise taxes on a number of products (including con-
struction materials, tobacco, mineral oils and so on), which induced a 
short-lived jump in inflation. 
As a member of the EU, Poland is obliged to provide the European 
Commission with a detailed report on fiscal stance, including general gov-
ernment deficit and debt statistics, in accordance with the European System 
of National Accounts (ESA'95). In preparation for such reports, the Polish 
Government has redesigned its budgetary process by distinguishing 
between three basic subsectors of public finance: central government, local 
government and social security funds. This distinction has proven to be 
very helpful for enacting appropriate fiscal reforms aimed at decentralizing 
the budget, streamlining funds to their main intended recipients and broad-
ening the tax base. 
Furthermore, in order to develop compliance with the EU budgetary pro-
cedures, the Polish Government has enacted a series of legislative documents, 
including the 'Medium Term Public Finance Strategy' of September 2003, 
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the 'Programme of Consolidation of Public Expenditures' of January 2004 
and 'The Convergence Programme' of April 2004. A driving force behind the 
ongoing fiscal consolidation is the officially declared plan to adopt the euro 
in the unspecified future. Accordingly, the fiscal authorities are now facing 
the challenge of maintaining fiscal discipline as stipulated by the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). They are compelled to demonstrate efforts 
to bring the budget deficit down to 3 per cent in relation to GDP. In fact, the 
SGP has been used extensively by the authorities as a politically convenient 
excuse for maintaining fiscal discipline. Aspirations to enter the eurozone 
provide a compelling justification for the government to reduce budgetary 
expenditures and, at the same time, to maintain taxes at a level low enough 
to promote growth and high enough to balance the budget. For instance, in 
response to the deteriorating budgetary situation, the government adopted 
an expenditure rule (in 2002) according to which central government spend-
ing was limited to an annual rise of 1 per cent above the inflation rate. The 
need to undergo further fiscal consolidation is quite apparent. As evidenced 
by the data in Table 6.1, there is a propagation of the general government 
budget deficit to the degree exceeding the maximum allowed benchmark of 
3 per cent of GDP and an increase in public debt getting closer to the 
maximum of 60 per cent of GDP stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty. 
The pronounced acceleration of the general government budget deficit 
over the past three years poses a serious problem to the implementation of 
fiscal consolidation. Yet, there are some optimistic developments. The 
expected increase in economic growth is likely to ease pressure on the deficit 
and to stabilize the level of indebtedness. Taking into account the faster 
economic growth that has been recently driven by high investment and 
exports, the projected decline of the deficit from 4.2 per cent of GDP in 
2005 to 1.5 per cent in 2007, as specified in the Polish Government 
Convergence Programme (Republic of Poland, 2004) appears to be realis-
tic. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, the government needs to reduce 
expenditures on public administration and on selected social programmes. 
While it is reasonable to expect reduced costs of debt servicing due to 
steadily declining interest rates, spending cuts on public administration and 
social programmes will have to be decisively administered. However, spend-
ing cuts on social programmes may pose a major challenge as they are polit-
ically unpopular and risky. 
Major challenges to a successful implementation of fiscal consolidation 
can be detected by analysing recent budgetary developments and projec-
tions within the three basic subsectors of the budget, as defined by ESA'95 
(Table 6.2). 
Large central government expenditures that are allocated predominantly 
to social programmes and public administration constitute the primary 
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Table 6.2 General government budget balance and public debt in Poland 
(ESA'95) (% GDP) 





Social security funds 
-1.8 -3.5 -4.0 -4.1 -5.7 -4.2 -3.3 -1.5 
-1.9 -4.2 -4.6 -5.6 -6.4 -5.5 -4.8 -3.4 
-0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 
+ 0.6 +1.0 +0.9 +1.7 +0.9 +1.8 +1.9 +2.0 
General government debt 36.6 36.7 41.2 45.3 49.0 51.9 52.9 52.3 
Note: Ministry of Finance forecasts are indicated in italics. 
Source: Republic of Poland, Convergence Programme, Warsaw, April 2004. 
area of concern within the consolidated budget. In the 2004 budget, the 
consolidated expenditures in relation to GDP reached 23.5 per cent for 
social transfers, 15.1 per cent for public administration, 9 per cent for public 
consumption and only 2.9 per cent for interest on public debt (Republic of 
Poland, 2004, p. 26). Since the central government conducts the majority 
of spending on social programmes and public administration, its deficit 
level reached 6.4 per cent while the local government deficit was only 0.2 
per cent of GDP. Needless to say, the success of fiscal consolidation pro-
jected in Table 6.2 will depend on the government's ability and determin-
ation to reduce spending in these politically sensitive areas.3 At the local 
level, the major accession-related task for governments is to improve their 
absorptive capacity to dispose the EU transfers related to common agri-
cultural policy (CAP) subsidies as well as structural and cohesion funds. 
A serious challenge to fiscal consolidation stems from rising transfers 
related to the ageing population. The need to foster EU tax coordination 
and to restructure the public finances in order to prepare for the budgetary 
consequences of the ageing population was emphasized in the 1999 
Commission report on economic and structural reform in the EU (Cardiff 
II). The gravity of the ageing problem in Poland can be illustrated by the 
ratio of retired to working age population, which is expected to rise from 
the recently reported level of 62 per cent in 2002 to the projected 69 per cent 
in 2010 and 94 per cent in 2050. The large share of retirees, along with the 
negative growth of the country's total population will impose a serious 
rigidity on social spending programmes. 
Within the next several years, the social security fund is expected to show 
a rising surplus (Table 6.2). This projected surplus stems from the ongoing 
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contributions to the special 'open retirement funds' by the insured persons, 
while the first payments from these funds are scheduled to take place only 
in 2009 (the intended year for adopting the euro!). The changes adopted by 
the EU Council, of Ministers at its March 2005 meeting which now allow 
for accounting contributions to these funds as budget revenues are of 
crucial importance for Poland, as their inclusion may help the country meet 
the Maastricht budget deficit criterion by the time of examination for the 
euro entry. 
In addition to reforming government expenditures, policymakers face 
the challenge of determining an optimal level and pragmatic rules of tax-
ation. The efforts in this direction pursued by the Polish Government are 
encouraging. Since 1999, the Ministry of Finance has reduced corporate 
income taxes from 27 to 19 per cent, closing at the same time many of 
the existing tax loopholes. It also allowed for accelerated depreciation 
allowances and established a special fund for restructuring the budgetary 
obligations of some firms with serious liquidity problems. Personal income 
taxes have been also significantly reduced. In spite of these reductions in 
tax rates, tax revenues have been growing steadily. The 2006 Budget 
Proposal introducing a linear flat tax of 18 per cent (submitted in March 
2005 by the Ministry of Finance), if passed by the parliament, should 
further contribute to higher tax revenues as it will likely translate into accel-
erated income growth. In addition, tax revenues should also benefit from 
the existing institutional improvements in tax administration and. in the 
collection system. 
It should be further noted that the official programme of fiscal consoli-
dation (Republic of Poland, 2004) will materialize only in the absence of 
serious threats to financial stability. Among these might be the possibility 
of a significant depreciation of the Polish zloty (PLN) as well as the danger 
of renewed inflationary expectations that would have to be restrained by 
the NBP with higher interest. These would contribute to higher debt service 
payments. Other dangers include a possible propagation of political risk 
stemming from the recent corruption scandals involving government 
officials. In addition, the erosion of public support for the government due 
to its inability to reduce rampant unemployment may further exacerbate 
the political risk. 
Poland's membership of the EU is likely to improve the state of public 
finance due to the injection of net transfers from the EU budget. The main 
components of estimated transfers and contributions to the EU budget 
are shown in Table 6.3. It should, however, be noted that the presented data 
are only estimates based on the results of accession negotiations at the 
December 2002 Copenhagen Summit and do not necessarily reflect actual 
appropriations and payments which are yet to be disclosed. 
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Table 6.3 EU appropriations for Poland (EUR million in 1999 prices) 
Total transfers to Poland 
Pre-accession assistance 
Agriculture (total): 
1. market measures 
2. direct payments 
3. development of rural areas 
Structural actions (total): 
1. structural funds 
2. cohesion funds 
Internal policies (total): 
1. existing policies 
2. institutions building 
3. Schengen instrument 
Special cash-flow facility 





































































Source: Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2004). 
Among the receipts, structural funds are the largest initial component, 
followed by CAP subsidies. Structural funds are designated mostly for infra-
structural projects thus the data in Table 6.3 reflect mostly granted funds, 
which may take longer to be actually transferred. The assistance to the agri-
cultural sector is eXpected'to rise in proportion to other receipt items during 
the years following formal EU entry. CAP payments to Polish farmers will 
reach respectively 55, 60 and 65 per cent of the level of corresponding sub-
sidies in the incumbent EU member states during the first three years of 
membership (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 2004). This is because full-scale 
assistance would be extremely expensive for the EU, given the large size of 
Polands' agricultural employment, which comprised 19.6 per cent of total 
employment in 2002, while the sector's value added was merely ,3.1 per cent 
of total value added in the economy (European Commission, 2003). Direct 
payments to farmers are expected to be the fastest growing component 
among all transfer categories. In contrast, the assistance aimed at strength-
ening internal policies will rise at a slower rate. These funds are particularly 
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needed in the early stage of membership as they are aimed at strengthening 
institutions indispensable for the implementation of Community Jegislation 
and for reinforcing border controls (the Schengen Instrument). In addition, 
Poland will receive large direct cash transfers (the Special cash-flow facility) 
designated to improve absorptive capacity and to cushion the fiscal burden 
of the initially large contributions to the EU budget. 
Poland's contributions to the EU budget will come from three main 
sources: (1) traditional resources (mainly revenues from import duties and 
agricultural duties); (2) value added tax (VAT) revenues; and (3) resources 
based on gross national income (GNI). Along with other EU member 
states, Poland is also obliged to contribute to the 'British rebate', or special 
VAT refund scheme granted by the EU to the United Kingdom. 
In summary, Poland is expected to be a net recipient of sizeable funds 
from the EU, estimated at 0.8 per cent of GDP for 2004, gradually increas-
ing to 1.3 per cent for 2005 and 1.4 per cent for 2006.4 However, the large 
scale of these net transfers is not automatically guaranteed, as some delays 
in CAP subsidies due to bureaucratic hurdles have already been reported. 
In addition, some structural fund appropriations that have already been 
granted may take some time to materialize. 
There is still another important dimension of the necessary fiscal reform, 
that is, the determination of an appropriate type of fiscal governance. 
Following a proposal made by Hallerbeg et al. (2004), fiscal policies can be 
bound by rules, thus following a contract approach, or they can be based 
on a high degree of finance ministry discretion, consistent with the delega-
tion approach to budgetary decisions. These authors show empirically that, 
based on the EU experience, coalition governments are more likely to 
employ the contract approach, while single or majority party governments 
are likely to delegate the budgetary decision-making power to finance min-
isters in order to alleviate the coordination problem that is inherent in the 
fiscal policy process. One may reasonably assume that these findings will 
also hold for Poland in the near future. Therefore, the design of a fiscal 
policy framework that is consistent with the delegation approach seems to 
be a viable option, since a majority party government is likely to prevail in 
the future, after the recent wave of consolidation of major political parties 
in Poland. 
6.4 M O N E T A R Y C O N V E R G E N C E 
Concurrently with fiscal reforms, Poland's monetary policy regime had to 
undergo equally challenging changes during the course of preparations for 
the EU accession. The general objective of these adjustments was to ensure 
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a sustainable degree of financial stability in the spirit of one of the three 
Copenhagen EU accession criteria, namely, the task of establishing a well-
functioning market economy. In order to generate a stable financial envir-
onment, the NBP faced the task of devising a proper monetary policy 
framework that would, at minimum, effectively contain inflation, mitigate 
exchange rate risk, and help establish a solid record of policy credibility. 
Defining such, a policy framework turned out to be an intricate task at 
the early stage of preparations for the EU accession. The exchange rate 
anchor had to be given up relatively early, as the combination of currency 
peg and high, double-digit inflation led to real currency appreciation, which 
in turn exacerbated Poland's current account deficit and deteriorated the 
risk structure of capital inflows (the move toward short-term and away 
from long-term capital inflows). The evolution of the country's exchange 
rate system is synthesized in Table 6.4. 
The hard peg to the US dollar was instrumental in the elimination of the 
corrective inflation and the diffusion of-the monetary overhang in the early 
1990s. Once an acceptable degree of financial stability appeared in sight, 
the monetary authorities enacted a soft peg in the form of the crawling 
devaluation with a 7 per cent symmetric band around the parity rate on 16 
May 1995. A further notable move toward greater flexibility coincided with 
the official inception of direct inflation targeting in January 1999. DIT is a 
monetary policy framework that is based on the assumption of long-term 
price stability as the official policy goal through designation of the official 
Table 6.4 Evolution of Poland's exchange rate regime 
1 Jan. 1990-17 May 1991 
17 May 1991-30 Apr. 1993 
1 May 1993-15 May 1995 
16 May 1995-24 Feb. 1998 
25 Feb. 1998-31 Dec. 1998 
1 Jan. 1999-11 Apr. 2000 
12 Apr. 2000-present 
Exchange rate regime 
(Classification)* 
hard peg (2) 
crawling peg (5) 
crawling peg (5) 
crawling band (9) 
crawling band (9) 
crawling band (9) 














+ / - 1% 
+ / - 1% 
+ / - 7 % 
+ / - 10% 
+ / - 15% 
-
Note: * The exchange rate classification number is based on the 'fine course' determined 
by Rogoff et al. (2003, p. 55), and it ranges from the least flexible (no separate legal tender = 
class 1) to most flexible exchange rate arrangements (free float, class 13; freely falling, class 
14, and dual market in which parallel market data is missing, class 15). 
Source: Own compilation based on IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements 
and Restrictions (various editions). 
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V 
target ranges for the inflation rate (Orlowski, 2000). DIT focuses directly 
on achieving the predetermined inflation target and by this virtue it differs 
from alternative monetary policy regimes that may aim at lowering 
inflation in an. indirect way, for instance by focusing first on exchange rate 
stability objective. 
With the inception of DIT, the exchange rate band was effectively 
widened to 15 per cent around the central parity, which in essence denoted 
abandonment of the exchange rate based monetary regime. Once price sta-
bility became the predominant objective of monetary policy, the crawling 
devaluation mechanism could no longer be maintained since the forced cur-
rency weakening promulgated inflation via the active exchange rate channel 
of policy transmission. In recognition of this threat to price, stability, 
Poland's monetary authorities finally embraced a free float in .April 2000. 
After abandoning the exchange rate anchor in May 1995, the NBP was 
prompted to search for alternative regimes that would uphold the necessary 
policy discipline. As a consequence, it carried out several, rather ineffective 
policy experiments, beginning with interest rate targeting in 1996. This 
option proved to be flawed in the presence of sizeable capital inflows which 
induced large shocks to market interest rates in a continuously vulnerable 
financial system. For this reason, the NBP moved to monetary base target-
ing in 1997 and M2 money growth targeting in 1998. These alternatives 
proved to be ineffective as well, particularly in the presence of some conta-
gion effects from the Asian and Russian financial crises which infused large 
shocks to money balances. In addition, monetary targeting was not practi-
cal in an economy undergoing fast-paced monetization, as reflected by the 
overall growth of the M2 to GDP ratio from 15 per cent in 1991 to 43 per 
cent in 2002. As a result, money balances grew at a much faster rate than 
GDP, contributing to a large instability of income elasticity of money 
demand, which in turn made monetary targeting entirely implausible 
(Orlowski, 2004a). 
Under such circumstances, inflation targeting appeared to be the only 
viable option for Poland as it could offer an effective disciplinary anchor for 
monetary policy which got lost after departing from the currency peg; it 
could also underpin the authorities' commitment to disinflation (Jonas and 
Mishkin, 2003; Eichengreen, 2005; Orlowski, 2005a). However, the incep-
tion of the DIT .framework in January 1999 took place at the earliest pos-
sible time or, as argued by Christofferssen and Wescott (1999), even slightly 
prematurely, since inflation was still running at double-digit levels and a 
prior record of price stability had not yet been established. In spite of the 
violation of some prerequisites for the DIT inception specified as essential 
by Mishkin (2000), the DIT framework was embraced by the NBP as it 
entailed important benefits, which prevailed over the possible costs of 
Monetary and fiscal policy in Poland during EU accession 187 
missing overly optimistic inflation targets (Orlowski, 2001b, 2005a). 
Among the important DIT benefits is the explicit cornmitment to achieve 
ambitious and transparent inflation goals. An additional DIT advantage 
that is particularly pertinent to convergence to a common currency system 
is its ability to insulate the economy from balance of payments shocks. For 
this reason, DIT is an attractive policy option for Poland since inflation 
fluctuations there are predominantly influenced by nominal supply-side 
shocks, rather than real exchange rate and balance of payments shocks, as 
is empirically proven by Dibooglu and Kiitan (2005). In hindsight, it is well-
established in the literature that inflation targets must be believable in order 
to be effective; therefore, DIT could be introduced in Poland only when a 
minimum degree of 'foundational credibility' was in place. 
Due to the key strategic objective of reducing inflation from double-
digits to a low, sustainable level, a strict variant of DIT (as defined by 
Svensson, 1999) with year-end, narrowly defined targets appeared to be a 
viable policy option. As summarized in Table 6.5, the early variant of DIT 
was based on a strict CPI-inflation target of 6.6-7.8 per cent specified for 
December 1999. It seemed to be quite ambitious, considering the fact that 
the average monthly inflation in 1998 was 11.8 per cent (as shownin Table 
6.1). The initial-actual target realization was far from being satisfactory, as 
December 1999 inflation was 2 per cent higher than the upper bound of the 






































































Source: Own compilation based on NBP, Monetary Policy Assumptions (various issues). 
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operating target. It should also be noted that a similar mismatch was 
repeated in the second year of DIT. The target for December 2000 was set 
at 5.4^6.8 per cent, while actual inflation reached 8.5 per cent. In response 
to such prolonged target overshooting, the NBP took decisive policy steps 
to contain inflation to the degree commensurate with its ambitious target. 
It applied an extremely restrictive course of monetary policy as reflected by 
the average monthly real short-term (three months T-bill) interest rate, 
which reached 8.48 per cent during the January 1998-December 1999 
period, and an even higher rate of 8.60 per cent between January 2000 and 
June 2001. As a result, actual inflation at the end of 2001 fell to 3.6 per cent, 
well below the target of 6-8 per cent, and at the end of 2002 it fell to 1.9 per 
cent, also considerably below the 4-6 per cent target. In essence, it took 
approximately two and a half years to bring inflation down to the desired 
level, or in other words, to align private sector inflation expectations with 
the central bank forecast. Needless to say, the NBP was successful in estab-
lishing a solid ground for policy credibility and price stability, but it did so 
by applying an extremely restrictive course of monetary policy, which, 
without doubt, entailed certain welfare costs and contributed to the eco-
nomic slowdown in 2001-02. 
Once a satisfactory degree of financial stability was achieved, the NBP 
altered the DIT strategy by replacing year-end operating targets with the 
trend consistent linear inflation trajectory. By doing so, it has improved the 
transparency and credibility of the DIT regime, in line with the arguments 
introduced to the literature by King (1996). The trajectory approach is 
believed to be superior to the year-end target specification for several 
reasons. The stable linear target allows for expanding the time horizon of 
low inflation expectations, thus it contributes to lower long-term interest 
rates and promotes private sector long-term borrowing and investment. 
Moreover, the linear trajectory is also beneficial for resisting political pres-
sures on the central bank, which is not the case of year-end targets. In prin-
ciple, the trajectory maintains a steady course that is not subject to 
negotiations', while year-end targets are annually adjusted, which leaves 
them exposed to potential pressures. 
The current linear inflation trajectory in Poland is formulated in consis-
tency with the precepts of monetary convergence to the euro. The midpoint 
is set at 2.5 per cent - the rate roughly corresponding with the anticipated 
Maastricht reference rate. It is surrounded by the symmetric tolerance 
band of 1 per cent that allows for accommodating possible temporary 
shocks. In addition, the current DIT policy is highly transparent, as the 
NBP regularly publishes quarterly and annual inflation reports and dis-
closes its inflation projection to the general public. However, the current 
strict DIT framework, is not fully consistent with the key objectives of 
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monetary convergence to the euro as it focuses exclusively on the inflation 
target and does not incorporate an exchange rate stability objective. The 
NBP is continuously committed to the pure float, perhaps due to the tech-
nical difficulties in determining a long-run sustainable market equilibrium 
rate of PLN in EUR terms that could serve as a targeted reference rate. 
Modifications of Poland's and other new EU member states' monetary 
regimes on the final passage towards the euro will have to take into account 
a number of potential risks (Masson, 1999; Schadler, 2004). Chief among 
them are risks attributed to asymmetric shocks. In order to mitigate such 
risks, a clear and transparent monetary policy framework needs to be in 
place as it'will be imperative to explain how disruptions to financial condi-
tions will be dealt with. The effective absorption of exogenous shocks 
becomes particularly important upon entry to ERM II. Fiscal and mone-
tary policies need to provide capacity to support the limits on exchange rate 
volatility imposed by this interim mechanism preceding euro adoption. 
Monetary policy in particular needs to embrace a mechanism of respond-
ing to contagion effects of possible future financial crises. For this reason, 
a continuous commitment to inflation targeting would offer a necessary 
cushion for absorbing such effects. 
It should be noted at this juncture that there is a compelling historical 
record of Poland's effective responses to international financial crises. Two 
particular episodes underscore this claim: 
(1) the policy of counteracting possible contagion effects of the August/ 
September 1998 Russian financial crisis, and 
(2) the strategy of dealing with the May 2004 'accession syndrome'. 
The Russian moratorium on repayment of foreign currency debt declared 
on 29 August 1998 triggered a wave of contagion effects to international 
financial markets. Poland dealt with the shock relatively well as the gov-
ernment launched the so-called 'de-coupling' from Russia (Orlowski, 
2001a). Empirical research on this subject proves that such a strategic 
approach was indeed successful. There were only mild contagion effects 
from Russia to Poland (as oppose to the Czech Republic or Hungary) in 
the aftermath of the crisis (Linne, 1999), particularly with respect to 
eurobonds (Gelos and Sahay, 2001). This is because the PLN and the 
Russian ruble displayed a limited co-movement at the time, which was not 
the case with other Central and East European currencies. In addition, 
depreciation of PLN in USD terms was considerably milder relative to the 
fall of other currencies in the region, which might have stemmed from the 
NBP decision to cut interest rates at that time, while other central banks 
were forced to raise them in order to prevent capital outflows (Orlowski, 
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2001a). In an effort to insulate the Polish financial market from Russia's 
troubles, the NBP, by cutting interest rates, sent a 'signalling effect' to inter-
national markets* underpinning the country's systemic resilience to exter-
nal nominal shocks. In sum, thanks to its strong policy base, Poland 
weathered relatively well the shocks from the Russian financial crisis (as 
well as from the 1997-98 Asian crisis) that reverberated across the interna-
tional financial markets, while many other countries fell victim to recession. 
Its currency remained strong, capital inflows continued and the banks were 
not imperilled. 
Another noteworthy incidence of asymmetric shocks is related to the 
May 2004 EU accession. However, that was much easier to deal with than 
the 1998 disturbance, as Poland's economic policy base and its systemic 
foundation had become considerably stronger, resulting in the overall 
nominal shock being milder. The scope of the accession-related real and 
nominal disturbance is reflected by changes in the selected macroeconomic 
variables shown in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 The impact of Poland's E U accession on selected 
macroeconomic variables 




Gross fixed capital formation3 
Exports3 
Imports3 
Real industrial output3 
Real labour productivity3 
Average nominal wage in industry3 
Unit labour cost of industry (nominal)3 
Unemployment rate (ILO definition) 
HICP inflation 
Broad money growth rate (nominal)3'b 
Net domestic bank credit growth rate (nom.)3 















































a. Year-on-year percentage change (period average). 
b. Including foreign currency deposits. 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Warsaw and Osterreichische Nationalbank, Focus on 
Transition, 2/20Q4. 
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The real economy effects directly related to the EU accession included 
theacceleration of real GDP and industrial production in the first quarter 
of 2004. This phenomenon has been labelled by Polish economic analysts 
as 'the accession syndrome', which was based on a switch in industrial 
activity from the second to the first quarter, in anticipation of strong 
demand following EU entry. Other real effects included a strong increase in 
investment, a surge in exports of mainly industrial and food products, and 
a decline in imports. Notably, exports of food products rose significantly, 
contrary to prior warnings from some politicians and economists about a 
possible influx of less expensive Western food products following the acces-
sion. These fears were entirely unfounded. It should also be noted that in 
April 2004, on the eve of the accession, exports rose at the annual rate of 
41.6 per cent, while imports fell by 58.4 per cent, primarily due to-the align-
ment of tariffs with the common EU rates. 
In addition to shocks in the real sphere, EU accession triggered a mild 
inflation shock, caused mainly by higher VAT rates and excise taxes now 
aligned with the EU norms. The inflation effect was additionally exacer-
bated by the decline in domestic supply of certain food products and con-
struction materials which became unexpectedly popular among the buyers 
in other EU countries.5 In consequence, HICP inflation rose from the 
average rate of 0.7 per cent in 2003 to 3.4 per cent in the second half of 
2004. Broad money balances showed a proportional increase to inflation. 
Without doubt, EU accession augmented economic growth in Poland, 
primarily through a surge in industrial production, investment and exports. 
This" is a welcome development for monetary authorities because the 
national income acceleration helps reduce welfare losses stemming from the 
restrictive DIT policy. As a consequence, the EU accession shocks did not 
have to be curtailed with active monetary policy responses. 
Looking ahead, monetary policy during the final stage preceding euro 
adoption will have to rely on the continuous commitment to disinflation, 
but also incorporate the task of lowering the exchange rate risk. Therefore, 
the strict variant of DIT is no longer a viable policy option during the 
active preparations for the euro adoption. 
6.5 S E Q U E N C I N G O F M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y F O R 
T H E E U R O A D O P T I O N 
There is a common understanding in the literature that the adoption of 
the euro means relinquishing monetary autonomy of the candidate coun-
tries, but clearly there is no uniform 'one-size-fits-all'.policy prescription. 
The ongoing debate on this subject includes a variety of proposals 
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ranging from calls for a leap to unilateral euroization to a gradual con-
vergence relying on an extended application, of flexible DIT. One may 
however notice that with the passage of time the difference between an 
early euroization and a gradual policy adjustment becomes increasingly 
irrelevant. The bottom line is that Poland as well as other new member 
states will enter the euro system as soon as they complete the fiscal, mon-
etary and institutional convergence prescribed by the Maastricht criteria 
and go through the two-year minimum quarantine imposed by the ERM 
II rules. 
The proponents of an early adoption of the euro, including Brafkowski 
and Rostowski (2001), Buiter and Grafe (2002) and Begg et al. (2003) have 
identified, a number of benefits from such a bold move. They include elim-
ination of exchange rate risk, lower transaction costs, a more favourable 
climate for foreign direct investment and a clear framework for macroeco-
nomic policy discipline. However, a rush to a common currency may also 
entail large costs, particularly if the institutional convergence is far 
from complete (Nuti, 2002), making the domestic financial system vulner-
able to default risk. In addition, the country entering a common currency 
automatically relinquishes its monetary autonomy and the option to use 
exchange rates as a tool for countering nominal (mostly demand-side) 
shocks. In essence, an early euroization by itself is unlikely to resolve the 
remaining problems related to the institutional fragility of the real 
economy and the financial system; neither will it guarantee a necessary 
fiscal discipline. This is because the institutional deficiencies have much 
deeper roots than simply the monetary regime, and fiscal problems are a 
function of more than just the availability of seigniorage revenues 
(Eichengreen, 2005). For these reasons, the timing of formal euro adoption 
should matter less than having in place well-coordinated monetary, real and 
institutional convergence policies. A few more years of monetary indepen-
dence combined with disciplined fiscal policies may allow enough time for 
the necessary completion of institutional reforms. 
The qualified reservations against a premature euroization along with the 
Maastricht due process prescribed by the EU authorities have motivated 
researchers to seek more gradual policy solutions to euro convergence. In 
general terms, the gradualist proposals are based on various degrees of 
departure from the current strict DIT regimes. They infuse greater 
flexibility to various degrees by placing more or less balanced weights on 
inflation and exchange rate stability targets. It becomes clear that the two 
extreme solutions, namely a hard peg versus a full flexibility, which have 
been dismissed in the literature as viable policy options (Fischer, 2001) 
cannot work for the eurosystem accession programme. This is because 
the euro convergence necessitates a dual focus on. price stability and the 
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exchange rate stability. Thus flexibility becomes pragmatic in order to avoid 
extreme solutions. A critical task is to cope with the exchange rate risk as 
well as the interest rate risk, which entails an inflation risk premium when 
adjusted to real interest rates (Orlowski, 2003; Holtemoller, 2005). 
An extreme solution assigning preference to the exchange rate stability is 
proposed by Bofinger and Wollmershauser (2001, 2002) who advocate 
adopting a monetary regime based on flexible exchange rate targeting.6 In 
their policy scenario, exchange rate stability becomes the key policy objec-
tive, while price stability plays a secondary role, as it is presumed to be 
derived from less volatile exchange rates. However, their scenario implies a 
significant regime switch whichmight prove to be too costly for those new 
member states that follow DIT policies, including Poland, the Czech 
Republic and, to a lesser degree, Hungary. This is because the primary com-
mitment to the exchange rate stability objective may entail frequent and 
costly foreign exchange market interventions, particularly if financial 
markets continue to be vulnerable to large nominal shocks. In addition, it 
is highly uncertain whether the monetary regime focusing on exchange rate 
stability (even in a stricter form than the one allowed by the ERM II) will 
actually contribute to price stability. This is because the exchange rate 
channel of monetary policy transmission in the larger NMS such as Poland 
is rather, unstable (Orlowski, 2003).7 Therefore, a smooth transmission of a 
more stable exchange rate into low inflation is not automatically guaran-
teed upon assigning a strong priority to the exchange rate stability. 
A more balanced weighting of inflation and exchange rate stability 
targets is examined by Jonas (2004). His analysis focuses on the 'dual 
target-one instrument' policy scenario as an extension of the present DIT 
regimes, which assigns equal importance to the inflation and exchange rate 
stability targets. A central bank uses interest rates as a single policy instru-
ment to hit these, at times conflicting, targets. Possible conflicts between 
them may arise in the presence of a simultaneous currency appreciation 
and high inflation, when both are triggered by large capital inflows. In such 
a case, a deliberate lowering of the domestic currency value requires an 
interest rate cut, which in turn may jeopardize realization of the inflation 
target. Also, higher interest rates aimed at containing inflation are likely to 
aggravate currency appreciation and promulgate exchange rate volatility. 
The conflicts between the targets are particularly severe in the presence, of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect.8 A number of studies have argued that such 
an effect is prevalent, and contributes to high inflation in transition 
economies (Buiter and Grafe, 2002; Begg et al., 2003; Mihaljek and Klau, 
2004; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005). Others, particularly Egert et al. 
(2003), show that this effect has now evaporated. A compelling empirical 
study by Blaszkiewicz et al. (2004) shows that the Balassa-Samuelson 
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effect in Poland has been negligible since 1999, while before that it was 
quite pronounced, contributing between 1.5 and 2 per cent to annual 
inflation. With the expiration of this effect, the potential conflicts between 
inflation and exchange rate stability targets have little merit; so do the 
arguments for an early euroization that are derived on the basis of this 
effect. The strongest weight on inflation targets is assigned jn yet another 
scenario of gradual policy adjustments proposed by Orlowski (2005b) 
who introduces the monetary policy framework based on relative inflation 
forecast targeting (RIFT). This operational framework is a forward-
looking extension to the DIT regimes pursued currently by Poland as well 
as by several other new member states. It constitutes a viable solution for 
the final passage towards the euro as it is likely to facilitate monetary 
convergence and ensure a smooth entry to the euro system. Stating briefly, 
RIFT is based on targeting the differentials between the candidate 
country and the eurozone inflation forecasts, thus, in essence it is an 
advanced variant of DIT, which in principle focuses on domestic inflation 
only. Therefore, RIFT allows for combining a decisive commitment to 
disinflation with an effective price convergence. In this advanced policy 
framework, the inflation forecast differential becomes the key operating 
target of monetary policy, while exchange rate stability is treated only as 
one of the main indicator variables, and not as an auxiliary operating 
target. RIFT enables policymakers to focus exclusively on price stability as 
the main objective of monetary convergence. It therefore assigns priority 
to lowering inflation when a possible conflict between disinflation and 
exchange rate stability arises. 
To underpin a successful monetary convergence to the euro, the pro-
posed RIFT framework assumes a perfect identity between the long-term 
inflation targets of the candidate country and the eurozone. Therefore, in 
practical terms, the candidate's inflation based on HICP (harmonized 
index of consumer prices) can reasonably be expected to converge to less 
than 2 per cent by the time of the euro adoption. Instrumentalizatioft. of 
RIFT is based on the 'instrument dichotomy', that is, on interest jate 
adjustments in response to changes in the differential between domestic 
and' eurozone inflation forecasts, while exchange rate stability is secured 
with, foreign exchange market interventions. Thus, in essence, RIFT is an 
elaborate combination, of a forward-looking DIT and a managed float. 
Shocks to the exchange rate can be curtailed with higher interest rates only 
if they are destabilizing (elevating the exchange rate risk premium) and 
potentially threatening to realization of the inflation target.9 
It seems plausible and necessary to modify the current. Polish monetary 
regime based on strict DIT and the pure float by introducing solutions 
consistent with the proposed RIFT strategy. The NBP is presently well 
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equipped to consider such regime adjustment as it has developed an 
advanced inflation forecasting methodology, as well as the ability to apply 
efficiently indirect instruments of monetary policy implementation. In 
addition, the RIFT framework is unlikely to interfere with the ramifications 
of ERM II, since it also incorporates the precept of lowering the exchange 
rate risk premium. Nevertheless, the operational viability of such a com-
plex monetary policy framework is yet to be tested. 
In sum, the current strict DIT in Poland needs to be modified by incor-
porating the exchange rate stability objective. The same is required of 
other DIT countries pursuing monetary convergence to the euro (Jonas 
and Mishkin, 2003; Jonas, 2004; Orlowski, 2005b). Regardless of the 
selected direction of DIT modification, Poland can and should avail itself 
of the exchange rate flexibility afforded by ERM II, providing that the 
'standard' plus-minus 15 per cent band of currency fluctuations will be 
upheld, rather than the 'normal' band of 2.25 per cent prescribed origi-
nally by ERM I. It is, however, likely that the future band surrounding the 
official reference rate to the euro will be asymmetric, that is, wider on 
the appreciation side and much narrower (perhaps only 2.25 per cent) on 
the depreciation side. Under such circumstances, a tighter, than normal 
stance of monetary policy will be required in order to accommodate the 
prevalent exchange rate risk premium Within the short-term interest rate 
target. Moreover, frequent interventions will be called for in the presence 
of even relatively mild shocks to the exchange rate. Due to these con-
straints, remaining in the ERM II beyond the required two-year minimum 
period is not advisable. 
Reformulation of Poland's monetary policy upon entry to ERM II will 
take into consideration a proper choice of the. PLN per EUR reference rate. 
This choice is critically important. In principle, the official 'de jure' refer-
ence rate should correspond with the 'de facto' rate that is technically per-
ceived as a sustainable long-run equilibrium rate as' determined by .the 
financial markets. Mis-specification of the official rate at a level consider-
ably different from the market rate may lead to a number of destabilizing 
consequences. These can be encapsulated as follows: 
(1) A considerably stronger official rate than the market rate may precip-
itate short-term capital inflows, exacerbating inflation. The unfavour-
able risk structure of capital inflows, may result from expectations of 
an official devaluation. 
(2), A weaker official rate is likely to inflate the domestic value of foreign 
currency debt and raise the default risk. 
(3) Mis-specification of the official rate may effectively narrow the 
exchange rate tolerance hand, as its perceived percentage boundaries 
I T 
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will surround the long-run equilibrium market rate, not the official 
rate. This scenario will necessitate more frequent, seemingly asym-
metric foreign exchange market interventions. 
(4) A mis-specified official rate may function as a magnet, pulling the 
market rate in a wrong, subdptimal direction (Schadler, 2004) that 
may in turn threaten realization of the inflation target. 
(5) In general terms, the greater gap between the official rate and the 
market equilibrium .rate is likely to exacerbate exchange rate risk 
(volatility) as its choice will appear to be less credible and expect-: 
ations of rate resetting will arise. This risk will be greater if the 
official rate is too weak, as the'markets are likely to expect either 
resetting of the official rate or an easing of monetary policy in an 
effort to adhere to its actual level'. The easier policy stance will be 
suboptimal as it will clearly jeopardize realization of the inflation 
target. 
Considering the serious dangers of the official rate mis-rspecification, its 
careful and thorough estimation and determination becomes a critical task. 
So far, the attempts to determine the long-run equilibrium rate for Poland 
have produced mixed and rather inconclusive results. Steady-state equilib-
rium conditions modelled by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) have arrived at 
some suggestions. In contrast, Johanssen cointegration tests employed by 
Orlowski (2004a) have not produced conclusive results due to frequent 
regime changes, a high exchange rate risk premium and unstable key mon-
etary variables applied in cointegrating equations. 
There is a further complexity in the determination of the appropriate ref-
erence rate. This stems from the prevalent risk premia that are built into the 
equilibrium exchange rate (Orlowski, 2004b). Uncertainties about fiscal 
discipline and political stability may bring down the perceived market rate 
and demand a much tighter monetary .policy stance, that is, higher interest 
rates encapsulating such exogenous risk premia. Needless to say, the choice 
of the official rate must take into account the political risk and the fiscal 
policy outlook. In order to accommodate these risks, the official rate might 
be set at a slightly higher level than the long-run equilibrium rate perceived 
by the market. 
The process of selecting the appropriate official ERM II reference rate 
for PLN will require the application of correct procedures and robust for-
mulas. It is imperative not to determine the reference rate too soon (as 
appears to be the case in Hungary) in order to alleviate the above-listed 
serious dangers of its mis-specification. 
To reiterate, it-is advisable for Poland to continue the reliance of its mon-
etary policy on inflation targeting to the very end of the euro convergence 
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process. Yet, DIT needs to become more flexible in order to incorporate the 
exchange rate stability objective into the framework that will preserve the 
NBP commitment to price stability. The proposed RIFT framework 
appears to be viable for accomplishing these tasks. 
6.6 A S Y N T H E S I S : I M P L I C A T I O N S F O R F U T U R E 
E M U A C C E S S I O N 
Several important prescriptions for successful EU accession and an 
effective pursuit of convergence to the euro have emerged from the Polish 
experience. At the forefront is the ability to maintain fiscal, discipline, which 
is a function of the authorities' resilience to political pressures on govern-
ment spending. Equally important is the development of a simplified, 
transparent tax system, ultimately leading to adoption of a flat linear tax 
set at a low rate that is competitive within the EU. 
With respect to adjustments to the monetary regime, the objective of 
disinflation and price stability plays a critical role for balancing the attain-
ment of long-term economic growth and convergence to the euro. A flexible 
DIT framework is believed to be conducive to achieving such balance. At 
the initial stage of convergence to the EU and EMU, a strict DIT supported 
with high real interest rates was effective for lowering inflation to a man-
ageable, single-digit level. Yet, a strict DIT is not conducive to convergence 
to the euro, as the task of achieving exchange rate, stability, or more pre-
cisely, lowering the exchange rate risk will have to be incorporated in the 
DIT framework. 
Following Orlowski (2005b), this study advocates, for the final passage 
towards the euro, the RIFT framework which prioritizes realignment of the 
inflation forecast of the candidate and the eurozone and incorporates the 
exchange rate stability objective (within the ERM II) as the policy indica-
tor variable. Adherence to the relative inflation forecast is achieved pri-
marily by adjusting the differential between domestic and eurozone interest 
rates, while exchange rate stability is secured with, cautiously applied 
foreign exchange market interventions. 
In general terms, a successful completion of the EU/EMU convergence 
process necessitates enacting policies that would reinforce resilience to 
various types of financial risk. Among others, disciplined fiscal and mon-
etary policies need to be in place in order to mitigate the exchange rate 
risk. In the case of Poland, such policies are entirely possible providing 
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1. The Maastricht inflation convergence requirement calls for a euro-candidate country to 
achieve sustainable inflation not exceeding 1.5 per cent above the average of the three 
lowest inflation EU members The benchmark rate specified in the October 2004 ECB 
Convergence Report was 3.4 per cent. 
2. Specifically, the Ministry of Finance had to introduce equal taxation of goods irre-
spective of their origin, as well as special VAT schemes concerning travel agents, 
second-hand goods, investment in gold, and farm products. Special tax provisions 
had to be granted for intra-Community transactions (European Commission, 2003). 
During the course of accession negotiations, Poland was granted a number of deroga-
tions on VAT adjustments for residential housing, selected goods and periodicals 
(until the end of 2007), as well as a large number of food products (until the end of 
April 2008). 
3. Yet, the ability to cut spending will pose a major challenge. Following argument by von 
Hagen et al. (2001), fiscal adjustments are successfulif they are based on cuts in transfer 
payments, rather than on tax increases or cuts in government consumption and invest-
ments. Due to unfavourable demographic developments and strong political pressures, 
there is currently little chance of reducing transfer payments in Poland. 
4. Own estimates based on Ministry of Finance data. 
5. For instance, in June 2004 domestic prices of beef rose by 13.8 per cent, poultry 13.4 per 
cent, butter 7 per cent and sugar 48.5 per cent (additionally triggered by hoarding pur-
chases), relative to their level from the year before. Prices of building materials rose 11.4 
per cent. 
6. A similar recognition of the exchange rate stability target is presented by Natalucci and 
Ravenna (2003). 
7. A more optimistic view is presented by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) whose empirical tests 
indicate a seemingly robust channel of monetary policy transmission in the Central 
European countries, including Poland. 
8. The Balassa-Samuelson effect is based on the argument that there is a productivity shock 
in the tradable goods sector in an open economy, which in turn drives up wages of non-
t'radables and subsequently contributes to chronic inflation. 
,9. The] debate on designing an optimal monetary policy framework for convergence to the 
euro focuses mainly on relative importance of low inflation versus exchange rate stability 
targets. However, equally challenging, yet inadequately addressed, are issues of appropri-
ate choices of policy instruments. The advocated separation of interest rate adjustments 
in' response to the inflation target, and market intervention aimed at stabilizing the 
exchange rate seems to be in opposition to the calls for integrating both instruments pre-
sented by the proponents of using the monetary conditions index (MCI) as an instrument 
rule. Such a rule is, for instance, endorsed for Turkey by Us (2004). Yet, its implementa-
tion might be technically very difficult, if not impossible, at least in the case of Poland. 
Because the MCI rule-based policy may send conflicting signals about the policy stance, 
it may inhibit central bank credibility. 
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